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If we do not really die, it would be impossible for us really to rise again: a 
true resurrection depends on the irresolvable finality of death  If the “soul” 
of any given being is already eternal, then death is (however unpleasantly 
accomplished) a mere transition­point to the eternity not that awaits it, but 
that is in some sense already present for it  For, as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel (1770–1831) himself argues, eternity cannot come “after” time, or else 
eternity would be a point in time  Eternity must already be in some sense 
present to time 1 Thought like this, exactly as Hegel thinks it, eternity is 
a function of the absolute: it is how the absolute is  Eternity is therefore 
understood through being, not time  Karl Ludwig Michelet’s (1801–1893) 
Zusatz to Hegel’s text explains that “the true present is thus eternity” 2
In “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials”, Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) 
addressed Martin Heidegger’s (1889–1976) well­known comment “if I were 
yet to write a theology – which I am sometimes tempted to do – the word 
‘being’ would not occur in it”  Among many other things Derrida says of 
1  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im 
Grundrisse (1830) (GW20), Hamburg 1992, 248: “Der Begriff der Ewigkeit muß aber nicht 
negative so gefaßt würden, als die Abstraction von der Zeit [   ] ohnehin nicht in dem Sinn, als 
ob die Ewigkeit nach der Zeit komme; so würde die Ewigkeit zur Zukunft, einem Momente 
der Zeit, gemacht ”
2  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften 
II (TWA9), Frankfurt 1986, 55: “Die wahrhafte Gegenwart ist somit die Ewigkeit ” All 
translations from German, French, Greek, and Latin are mine 
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this remark, one stands out  Derrida asks, if Heidegger were to write a theol­
ogy, “where does this then take place?”3 When Derrida turns to Heidegger 
to understand the meaning of such a remark, he does so assuming that 
such a theology would be beyond metaphysics, and so outside the history of 
meta physics as it has unfolded, and taken into its folds Christianity itself  It 
is significant that Derrida tells us what this means: “Here, the dimension of 
being open to the experience of God who is not or whose being is neither 
essence nor ground ”4 It seems to me with this phrase Derrida falls back into 
the very place from which Heidegger wants to depart  For to speak of a God 
“whose being is   ”, even if that being is neither this nor that, is to speak of 
God and being together, all over again 
I want to propose that Derrida has, perhaps, mis­heard what Heidegger 
has said  For Derrida does not ask the obvious question: if you (Heideg­
ger) will write a theology without the word “being” appearing in it, who 
has already written such a theology, and why? Who already says “being” 
is the essence of God? And Derrida has, perhaps, not attended sufficiently 
to the sharpness of his own question: where, indeed when, would such a 
theology as Heidegger’s take place? For it must take place “presently”, but I 
will suggest, not in the present as conceived by those who wrote being into 
the essence of God, but rather, such a theology must reveal itself in present 
being, being as it discloses itself, not somewhere else, not “in eternity”, but 
in the “here” that “is” (Da-sein)  It must disclose itself in finite life, and 
to do that, it must confront the question of death  I want to suggest that 
Derrida’s “hauntology” is the last, ghostly, moment of a persisting ontothe­
ol ogy, which, if abandoned, will allow us to read all over again two things 
in Heidegger to which Derrida did attend with care  One is the meaning 
of Sein zum Tode (being towards death), the other is Heidegger’s “striking 
through” of beXyng  My suggestion is that if we do so, we can uncover that 
place from where Heidegger believed a theology after metaphysics could be 
written 
***
Ontotheology is a word at least as old as Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)  
When it appears late in the Critique of Pure Reason,5 Kant says little to 
3  Jacques Derrida, Psyché: Inventions de l’autre, vol  2, Paris 2003, 196: “Si je devais encore 
écrire une théologie, comme je suis parfois tenté de le faire, le mot ‘être’ devrait ne pas y 
apparaître  [   ] Où cela a­t­il­donc lieu?” Italics in original 
4  Derrida, Psyché, 197: “Ici, la dimension de l’être ouvre à l’expérience de Dieu qui n’est pas 
ou dont l’être n’est ni l’essence ni le fondement ”
5  Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (AA3/AA4), Berlin 1911, A632/B630 
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amplify what he means by it  The word appears more often in his notes 
on metaphysics, but receives a full discussion in his lectures on rational 
theology 6 Kant’s most ontotheological text, however, is a so­called “pre­ 
critical” text written in 1763, eighteen years before the publication of the 
First Critique, The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of 
the Existence of God, in which the word ontotheology does not appear even 
once  However, Kant later refers to the argument he presents in this text as 
“my ontotheological proof”,7 and Heidegger, considering this text in detail 
in “Kant’s Thesis about Being”, speaks of ontotheology at the very point 
where he names Kant’s text  Heidegger explains that “through the course 
of the history of ontotheological questioning the task has arisen not only 
of showing what the highest being is but to prove that this most beingful 
of beings is, and that God exists  The words existence, Dasein, actuality, 
name a mode of being” 8 Heidegger argues that the thesis about being in the 
First Critique (that “being is not a real predicate”) concords with the thesis 
in this earlier text – indeed that the earlier text explains what is meant by 
what the Critique of Pure Reason says about being as a real predicate  Kant 
grounds being in logic, not formal logic, but, as Heidegger says, the logic 
in which transcendental philosophy has its ground, and so “from that logic 
determined as the original synthetic unity of transcendental apperception  
In such logic ontology is grounded” 9 Being is not a real, “ontic”, predicate 
because it is the pre­eminently ontological predicate  It is properly not used 
relatively, that is of particulars, but absolutely, and so of the ens realissimum, 
the most real being – God 
Heidegger ordinarily uses the word ontotheology not referring to Kant, 
but to Hegel  Although Hegel knows the term, he never uses it of him­
self  Commentators who have noticed ontotheology’s long history ar­
gue that Heidegger speaks of it differently compared to Kant 10 Markus 
Gabriel claims that “Kant [   ] understands ‘ontotheology’ as the proof of the 
6  Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz, Immanuel Kant’s Vorlesungen über die philosophische 
Religionslehre, Leipzig 1817  See Immanuel Kant, Vorlesungen über Metaphysik und 
Rationaltheologie (AA28 2 2), Berlin 1972, 993–1120 
7  Immanuel Kant, Metaphysik Nachlaß I (AA17), Berlin 1926, 624: “Mein 
ontotheologischer Beweis ”
8  Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken (GA9), Frankfurt 1976, 450: “Im Verlauf der Geschichte 
des ontotheologischen Fragens entsteht die Aufgabe, nicht nur zu erweisen, was das höchste 
Seiende ist, sondern zu beweisen, daß dieses Seiendste des Seien den ist, daß Gott existiert  
Die Worte Existenz, Dasein, Wirklichkeit nennen eine Weise des Seins ”
9  Heidegger, Wegmarken, 462: “Die aus der ursprünglichen synthetischen Einheit der 
transzendentalen Apperzeption bestimmte Logik ”
10  Tom Sheehan, “Heidegger’s Lehrjahre”, in John C  Sallis, Giuseppina Moneta & Jacques 
Taminiaux (eds ), The Collegium Phaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years, Amsterdam 1988, 131, 
n  98, says of ontotheology: “that word was first used by Kant, but in a different sense ”
338 | stk ˙ 4 ˙ 2020 laurence paul hemming
existence of God [   ] On the other hand, I understand with Heidegger [   ] 
that ‘ontotheology’ fundamentally means the reduction of theologic and 
ontology” 11 It is clear that Heidegger derives his understanding of Kant’s 
use of ontotheology from Kant’s “proof”, and likewise Heidegger associates 
ontotheology in the first instance with Hegel’s lectures on the proofs for 
the existence of God 12 There is not space here to consider the question in 
the close detail that it requires, but there can be no doubt that Heidegger 
understood ontotheology to be the pinnacle of metaphysics to think the ens 
realissimum, the most real being, as that thinking of being which under­
stands the world to be mere appearance, and which understands being as 
other than, and the negation of, presence  Ontotheology argues that being 
can only be thought of as some absolute plenitude, some “more” than im­
mediate presence: some place where present being attains final fulfilment  
Gabriel leaves unclarified the reduction he names with “theologic” and on­
tology  On the basis of a centuries­long theistic thinking, we presume that 
theology reduces and overcomes ontology  In fact the reverse is the case, 
and even from the outset  For the ens realissimum is not a name for God, 
but God is merely a name for the highest and most real form of being  This 
means that even when “God” is dead, what has been accomplished in the 
description of the ens realissimum remains  Being reduces theologic to itself, 
and this is the history of ontotheology  “God” need only be a secondary, 
dependent, name for the absolute 
What has this to do with death? In Hegel’s lectures on the proofs for the 
existence of God he states quite early that the real purpose is to take partic­
ular being up, and so into absolute being  Simultaneously the fulfillment 
of metaphysics is equated with the Christian ideal  In Faith and Knowledge 
Hegel had mocked Kant for his failure to show how the resolution of the 
idea of the highest subjectivity is an absolute objectivity that does not “ter­
minate in faith, but is the only possible departure point of philosophy” 13 In 
the lectures on the proofs Hegel’s purpose – the goal of his entire philoso­
phy – becomes clear: logic, thought itself, must and will elevate itself from 
the particular to the absolute  He argues that “this elevation of the thinking 
11  Markus Gabriel, Der Mensch im Mythos: Untersuchungen über Ontotheologie, 
Anthropologie und Selbstbewußtseinsgeschichte in Schellings “Philosophie der Mythologie”, Berlin 
2006, 196, n  52: “Kant [versteht] unter ‘Ontotheologie’ den Beweis des Daseins Gottes [   ]  
Dagegen verstehe ich mit Heidegger [   ] unter ‘Ontotheologie’ grundsätzlich die Engführung 
von Theologik und Ontologie ”
12  See Heidegger’s remarks on ontotheology and Franz Anton Staudenmaier’s (1800–1856) 
1836 critique of Karl von Hegel’s (1813–1901) posthumous publication of his father’s lectures 
on the proofs for the existence of God in his preparatory notes for the 1930 lecture “Hegel und 
das Problem der Metaphysik” in Martin Heidegger, Vorträge (GA80 1), Frankfurt 2016, 32 
13  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Jenaer kritische Schriften (GW4), Hamburg 1968, 325: 
“Statt [   ] im Glauben zu enden, ganz allein die Philosophie anzufangen ”
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Geist [the particular subject] to that of which it is itself the highest thought, 
to God [absolute subjectivity] is thus what we wish to consider” 14 In hold­
ing out how the particular subject could elevate itself to think absolute sub­
jectivity, Hegel evacuated death, because the thinking subject always has a 
path to the eternal through the elevating activity of thought itself 
Death, for Hegel, is the moment of absolute negation of particular sub­
jectivity become absolute subjectivity as final freedom and universality 15 
Death resolves nothing, and is the harbinger of nothing in particular (the 
pure concept)  Derrida, in Spectres de Marx, recalls the lines in Hamlet that 
mark a divide between two worlds: Hamlet’s present (on the one hand) and 
the “proper” world (on the other) from where alone the truth is whole, the 
world where his father in some sense now “is”, and whose ghost has come 
to call those inhabiting the present to a wider truth  Hamlet is forced to 
acknowledge a limit when (Derrida says he says): “I’ll go no further”, to 
which the ghost replies “I am thy father’s spirit” 16 Derrida speaks of the 
ghost as a repetition: to be “thy father” and “thy father’s spirit” are not iden­
tical, but how? Derrida speaks merely of the way in which “each time it is 
the event itself, a first time is a last time  Entirely other  Composition for an 
end to history  We call this a hauntology  This logic of haunting would not 
only be more ample and more powerful than an ontology or a thinking of 
being”, it would “comprehend them, but incomprehensibly” 17 To compre­
hend is to stretch the hand right over and engulf, as well as to understand  
Only a ghost could make such a vastness comprehensible 
Derrida raises here the spectre of what we think is “really” real  For we, 
who live not yet “comprehended” (not yet finished, not yet dead, not yet 
confided to the shame of the whole, and all our untruth within it) can 
“see” this whole only without full comprehension  The spectral charac­
ter of ghosts, therefore, draws us to comprehend our own spectrality and 
14  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1816–1831) (GW18), 
Hamburg 1995, 234:  “Diese Erhebung des denkenden Geistes zu dem, der selbst der höchste 
Gedanke ist, zu Gott, ist es also, was wir betrachten wollen ”
15  See Hegel, Jenaer kritische Schriften (GW4), 448: “So ist [die Einzelheit schlechthin] der 
Begriff ihrer selbst, also unendlich und das Gegentheil ihrer selbst, oder absolute Befreyung, 
und die reine Einzelheit, die im Tode ist, ist ihr eigenes Gegentheil, die Allgemeinheit ” 
(“Thus [i e  in death] is this pure individuality its own concept, and therefore infinite, and the 
contrary of itself: or absolute liberation, and sheer individuality, which when in death is its 
own contrary, is universality ”)
16  William Shakespeare, “Hamlet”, 1 5, 1 9  
17  Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx: L'Etat de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle 
Internationale, Paris 1983, 31: “Chaque fois, c’est l’événement même, une première fois 
est une dernière fois  Toute autre  Mise en scène pour une fin de l’histoire  Appelons cela 
une hantologie  Cette logique de la hantise ne serait pas seulement plus ample et plus 
puissante qu’une ontologie ou qu’une pensée de l’être  [   ] Elle les comprendrait, mais 
incompréhensiblement ” Italics in original 
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provisionality, the present’s ghostly kind of being­true, before the end of 
history, which the fuller world beyond this one already fully knows, and 
knows as whole  Ghosts, the messengers of amplified finality, of the all 
as all, appear from this perfected place only as (for us) evanescing spirits, 
fracturing and blurring the stability and certainty we think as being our 
own  These spectres are mirrors (their silvering worn), whose indeterminacy, 
partial transparency, render us not only transparent to ourselves, but as con­
fused, as comprehending­incomprehensibly  They rob me of the certainty I 
think my self is  It is impossible not to see in these ghosts of Derrida’s the 
personifications of Hegel’s negations  Indeed, it is impossible not see the 
pure trace, as différance, as that which does not exist, as the placeholder of 
the metaphysical understanding of nothing, the μὴ ὄν  Derrida describes 
the trace as “in effect the absolute origin of sense in general” even if “we must 
return to saying, yet again, that there is no origin of sense in general” 18 Is this 
not how metaphysics marks all present presence with a nullity, a nothing­
ness that deprives it of its originary power, and yet is greater than anything 
we have so far and up to this present point yet owned?19
Derrida through his hauntology manages to capture, however fleetingly, 
the apocalypticism of Karl Marx (1818–1883) and make his (Derrida’s) own 
the claim (incomprehensibly) to comprehend the end of history  Derrida 
is well aware of the meaning of his gesture: Spectres de Marx is peppered 
with references to Francis Fukuyama and to Hegel, and Derrida himself 
reminds us in Spectres de Marx of his 1980 lecture and essay “The Apoca­
lyptic Tone in Philosophy” 20 He knows (rather better than the editors and 
introducers of the English translation, Specters of Marx)21 that Fukuyama’s 
reference to the “end of history” is a reference to a certain reading of Hegel, 
and to, not an event (that “history” is “done”), but the manner of a continu-
ing pres ence (that history is, before our very eyes, fulfilling itself as present 
doing)  Fukuyama’s “end of history” is itself the hinting, teasing, ghost of 
Hegel’s metaphysics, following its Marxist adventure, now in more classical­
ly lib eral attire  This presence takes a multitude of names: this ghost is not 
18  Jacques Derrida, De la grammatologie, Paris 1967, 92, 95: “La trace est en effet l’origine 
absolue du sens en général. Ce qui revient à dire, encore une fois, qu’il n’y a pas d’origine absolue du 
sens en général. La trace est la différance ” Italics in original 
19  Is this not why Hegel says we are never yet “subject”, and why Heidegger says we have 
never yet been Da-sein? Not, in other words, that “we”, subjecthood, Dasein, have so far scored 
low marks in the test that life itself is, but that the presence of the present as such is always 
somehow provisional and incomplete, even in its origins?
20  Derrida, Spectres de Marx, 37 
21  Who, oddly, persist in the belief that the phrase “the end of history” means that history 
has come to an end, when Derrida’s own reading is clearly attuned to Fukuyama’s actual sense  
See “Introduction” to Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of 
Mourning and the New International, New York 1994, vii  
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nameless on account of having no name, but is impossible to name simply 
be cause it can own so many (its subject is multiplicity)  Derrida cites Maurice 
Blanchot (1907–2003) as calling it the “end of philosophy” (but he was not 
the first),22 but to this name we could add Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844–1900) 
will to power, or eternal recurrence 23 Hegel himself, according to Eduard 
Gans (1797–1839), called it “the path of God through the world”,24 and 
Fukuyama “Hegel’s non­materialist account of history”,25 drawing attention 
all over again to the immateriality, the phantasmagoric being, of Geist 26
Derrida, as much as he does not admit, cannot really conceal, that 
this amplitude which is greater than ontology, and from which ultimate 
truth flows (incomprehensibly), is the metaphysical ground of presence as 
such  As an end, it allows the beginning to come into view all over again, 
and yet does not admit of beginnings or ends (we comprehend we cannot 
comprehend “it all”)  Derrida’s suggestion “could one address one’s self in 
gener al if already some phantom did not come back?”,27 concedes that what 
Fukuyama names as Hegel’s “struggle for recognition” is dependent, not 
only on presence as such, but on presence­in­general, the presence that lies 
beyond the present, the only possible source of “final” truth (even if such 
a “possible” is really an “im/possible”): the truth to which ghosts witness, 
the truth of Geist as such, a truth whose certainty we must dis­own  Here 
one would have to concede that the “metaphysics of presence” is not quite 
as Derrida had named it in De la grammatologie, as the “ambiguity of the 
Heideggerian situation” which encompasses “all the metaphysical determi­
nations of truth and even that beyond metaphysical onto­theology which 
Heidegger evokes” 28 What is it Derrida had failed to name? What remains 
uncomprehended, outside Derrida’s playful, but still otherwise total, grasp?
Derrida’s assault on “the metaphysics of presence” – logocentrism, onto­
theology, the origin of grounds – does not itself escape from understanding 
presence in a very specific way, since it is an attempt to comprehend every 
kind of presence, even the fictional presence of im/possibility  This is not 
22  Derrida, Spectres de Marx, 67, citing a text of Blanchot’s of 1959 
23  In which being (das Sein) itself is no more than steam and a vapour 
24  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (TWA7), 
Frankfurt 1986, 403, note: “[Die] Gang Gottes in der Welt ”
25  Francis Fukuyama, “By Way of an Introduction” to the 20th Anniversary Edition of The 
End of History and the Last Man, London 2012, xvi 
26  A point also not lost on Derrida  Comparing the spectre of communism (“das Gespenst 
des Kommunismus”) with Hegel, Marx notes that “la sémantique du Gespenst hante elle­
même la sémantique du Geist”  Derrida, Spectres de Marx, 175 
27  Derrida, Spectres de Marx, 279: “Peut­on s’adresser en général si quelque fantôme déjà ne 
revient pas?” Italics in original 
28  Derrida, De la grammatologie, 21: “Toutes les déterminations métaphysiques de la vérité 
et même celle à laquelle nous rappelle Heidegger, par­delà l’onto­théologie métaphysique ”
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“criticism” of Derrida, and far less than that, any kind of refutation  It is 
inherent to presence itself that we are both bound to presence and seek 
escape from what is binding  This is not a mere “failure” in our psychology, 
or cleverness, or capacity to think, but belongs to our becoming present  
In the drive to escape what threatens to bind us, it is world itself (and not 
self­presence) that opens up; all our certainty is gone when we are faced with 
mortal threat  For Derrida’s constant drawing us back to the instability, the 
playfulness, différance, and the provisionality of presence is itself the mark 
of a metaphysics that both draws attention to its overcoming, and to our 
inability to bring this overcoming about merely because we might “will it” 
to be so  For the concern with the metaphysics of presence is the persistent 
presence of ontotheology, or rather, is indicative of not being able to step 
away from the persistence in philosophy of that understanding of pres ence 
that ontotheology itself is  The only way we find out how to step away 
is when we are driven off  Mortal threat is one such drivenness  It is not 
what presence is that is ever in question, but, had we enough time to begin 
the question, the how?, the manner of presence’s presencing  Ontotheology 
assigns the meaning and ground of presence to somewhere else, “beyond 
present being in importance and power”,29 whether that is to “the good” 
for Plato (c  428–c  348 BCE), or “becoming” for Nietzsche, or “negation” 
for Hegel  Indeed, Hegel makes explicit that “the world heads towards a 
being which is only illusory, not the true being, not absolute truth”, and 
so not the “absolute” of ontotheology, towards which the world can only 
point 30 In each case, as Heidegger has indicated, the basic tendency of meta­
physics is a place or a concept of permanent presence that understands pre­
sent pres ence as non­being and less­than­being  Does the trace escape this 
description? The consequence of this, Heidegger argues, is to be found in 
Aristotle’s (384–322 BCE) understanding of θεωρεῖν, wisdom (σοφία) it­
self, or an “abiding with what is eternal” such that “there exists for human­
ity, there fore, a certain possibility of ἀθανατίζειν, a mode of being for hu­
manity in which it has the highest possibility of not coming to an end” 31 
Ἀθανατίζειν means here both “becoming immortal”, divine, and “deathless­
ness”  Heidegger remarks that this is the extreme position which Plato and 
Aristotle foresaw for human existence  Metaphysics has at its very origins, 
and in its end, in speculation (θεωρεῖν) and in absolute subjectivity, the 
29  Plato, Republic VI 509b: ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει 
30  Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (GW20), 88 
31  Martin Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes (GA19), Frankfurt 1992, 177–178: “Sich Aufhalten 
beim Immersein, das θεωρεῖν [   ] Darin besteht für den Menschen eine gewisse Möglichkeit 
des ἀθανατίζειν (Nicomachean Ethics 1177 b 33), eine Seinsart des Menschen, in der er die 
höchste Möglichkeit hat, nicht zu Ende zu gehen ”
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grandiose purpose of overcoming death, and providing access to an eternal, 
immortalizing mode of being  Moreover, mortality, the advance of death, 
manifests as an outermost, an extreme, of presence, within which finally 
we struggle to the utmost to hold fast  A metaphysical deferral of death and 
mortality, and its capacity for making absence present, is hardly difficult to 
understand in such an age as ours, which refuses the “beyond” of where we 
might live “after” death, and so clings fervently, either to present presence, 
or resigns itself to negation, nothing at all 
If we find the totality of presence itself assigned somewhere else, other than 
within present presence, what would this mean for death? Surely it would 
mean that death is not really death: say, if death were the mark, not of an 
impassable limit, but a to­whence, a place “beyond”, at which a different 
kind of presence were assigned – let us say, in an eternal life (elsewhere), or 
even eternal punishment (eternity of a kind, however nasty)  If we abandon 
this other place, does this mean that all there is, is immediacy of the mo­
ment, eternal presencing of the “now”? Or does it not rather mean what the 
Greeks originally meant by the allotted time of a life: αἰών, which Aristotle 
once said was first identical with what was also said by means of ψυχή, a 
life, a soul 32
When we do not stand over­against the totality of presence (which is the 
mark of metaphysics’ presencing, the co­appearing and yet irresolvability 
of the particular with the universal which points to something more than 
either of them, and yet cannot point to how), presence­as­a­whole makes 
itself present in a way quite other  Mortal death, which threatens to tear 
the presencing of present presence away from me, and so presences as this 
threat, as absence presencing, brings forward this how  How is it that this 
befalls me, or befalls another, without escape?
If the recognition that death is a central concept in Heidegger’s Sein und 
Zeit is a commonplace,33 no one, to my knowledge, has recognized that 
Heidegger’s phrase “Sein zum Tode”, “being towards death”, is not a neolo­
gism or innovation, but quite the contrary, a return: to the originary Greek 
understanding (at least from Homer out) of the human being as θνητός  
The dictionary definition for this word is not only “mortal”, for which 
θνητός is shorthand, but more properly means “liable to death”, death as 
“what comes towards us” 34 θνητός stands out as alongside and belonging 
32  Homer in several places equates soul (ψυχή) with αἰών, which Aristotle discusses at 
length in De caelo, 279 a 5–279 b 5 
33  Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (GA2), Frankfurt 1977 
34  Definition from Henry George Liddell & Robert Scott, A Greek–English Lexicon, 9th 
ed , Oxford 1996, 802  Johann Gottlob Schneider, Handwörterbuch der Griechischen Sprache, 
vol  1, Leipzig 1819, 712: “einem Menschen zukommend” (“what comes towards a man”) 
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to that other name for those, central to the Greek understanding of world, 
ἀθάνατοι, the deathless gods  Of this, Heidegger has nothing specific to say 
in Sein und Zeit, although well aware of it  Why does a particular possibil­
ity of understanding death enter philosophy with Heidegger? Or rather, 
why is it possible for Heidegger to allow an understanding of death to re­ 
emerge, from having already been there at the beginning? Many commen­
tators who have understood especially the period from the early modern 
thinkers up to Romanticism as a period preoccupied with death, a “necro­
philiac time”, have singled out Heidegger’s “being towards death” as evi­
dence of the death­ drive that they find at the heart of Western, modern, 
thought  These observations often heavily depend on the history of litera­
ture  They do not help us: even if literature lends form to thought, thinking 
far exceeds the genealogy of literary form 
What Heidegger does say in the course of the long preparation for what 
became the publication of Sein und Zeit is that only since Nietzsche’s procla­
mation of the “death of God” has a return to an understanding of human 
existence as “being towards death” been reopened for thinking  It is this 
that Heidegger means when he announces that “philosophical research is 
and remains atheism”,35 connecting this argument directly with Nietzsche’s 
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, in which his death of God first came into print 36 
The death of God means the end of a manner of presence: that is to say, that 
understanding of presence that says in the mens Dei all being and all time 
are held and comprehended in the simultaneity of a single act of know­
ledge 37 What makes Heidegger a singular reader of the Greeks is that he 
recognized in the completion of metaphysics, in the coming into its end 
of a centuries­long way in which presence itself had unfolded, the way was 
newly opened for thinking to experience all over again the inceptual place 
from out of which that metaphysics had itself begun, and, taking sight of 
that place, to ask what it would mean to open up this beginning again  It 
asks this question not as a genealogical task, a history and litany of erudite 
35  Martin Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA20), Frankfurt 
1979, 109–110: “Philosophische Forschung ist und bleibt Atheismus ” See also p  110: “Und 
gerade in diesem Atheismus wird sie zu dem, was ein Großer einmal sagte, zur ‘Fröhlichen 
Wissenschaft’ ”
36  Friedrich Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Chemnitz 1882 
37  Aquinas formulates this in the following way: “Deus autem omina videt in uno, quod 
est ipse  [   ] Unde simul, et non successive omnia videt ” (“God therefore sees all things in 
one, which is himself  Therefore he sees them simultaneously, and not successively ”) Summa 
Theologiae 1a, 14, art  7, resp  He adds: “Deus [   ] cognoscat omnia simul ” (“God knows 
everything simultaneously ”) Summa Theologiae 1a, 14, art  12, ad 2  Aquinas, citing Boëthius 
(c  480–c  524), similarly argues that eternity is an act of being, not of temporality: “Quia 
eternitas est mensura esse permanentis ” (“Since eternity is the measure of permanent being ”) 
Summa Theologiae 1a, 10, art  4, resp 
stk ˙ 4 ˙ 2020 | 345death's presents
forms, but as a demand, the demand that the present is, and so “presents”  
We do not, idly, think up new ways of thinking; rather thinking makes on 
us a thoughtful demand 
Essential is the possibility of a renewed appropriation of the meaning 
of being as such  Being is always understood by Heidegger as presence, 
Anwesenheit, which he continually and repeatedly asserts is the basis of the 
Greek experience of being  This understanding of presence returns us to 
the Da, the “here”, of Da-sein, here­being  What preoccupies Heidegger, 
and what causes him at a certain point in Sein und Zeit to hyphenate the 
ordinary German term Dasein (“existence”) as Da-sein, here­being, is the 
emphasis on the Da of Da-sein as the meaning of the present “being” of 
pres ence, Anwesenheit 38 It is within this Da, this present­presence, that 
death advances towards and comes to befall each human being in turn  
From this understanding Heidegger explores with patient care in the pages 
of Sein und Zeit the horizon of the finitude of being, as the way in which the 
death of another opens each one of us to the limitation to our own future 
existence, and this at death 39
Other than Sein und Zeit, the phrase Sein zum Tode is mentioned once, 
in only one other work published in Heidegger’s lifetime, and hardly ever in 
his Freiburg lecture courses (two brief references only, from what we know)  
In contrast, in several places in the Nachlaß material of his unpublished 
writ ing from the same period (now almost all available in print), the en­
during importance of “being towards death” in his later thinking is very 
clear 40 Perhaps the most fundamental transition in Heidegger’s thought 
over this period is from the notion of Dasein as the being of being­human, 
to Da­sein, as the enquiry into presence that constitutes the being of the 
“here”, or Da 41 Around 1936 it appears Heidegger prepared a recapitulation, 
or set of “current remarks”, on the text of Sein und Zeit in which he sets 
aside the notion of “being towards death” as the “concealed ground of the 
historicality of Dasein” as an enquiry that is “metaphysical” in its intention, 
in favour of the enquiry into Da­sein, “here­being”, as the transition that is 
38  See, for a full discussion of this, Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes (GA19), 466–467  
39  Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (GA2), 314–331  This is the opening of the discussion of 
“Dasein and Temporality”  
40  The reason for the disappearance, Heidegger suggests in many places in the Nachlaß 
material, has to do with the taking over of Sein zum Tode, not as a determination of presence 
and Da-sein, but through Weltanschauung, a “world­view”  See especially Martin Heidegger, 
Beiträge zur Philosophie (GA65), Frankfurt 1989, 282–286 
41  It is too little noticed that the hyphenation of Da-sein, in all its forms, with all its 
different italicizations, is an attempt to explicate a mode of being, of present-being (Da-sein), 
not a masked “anthropology” of the “human being” 
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in itself historical, the unfolding of “the event” (das Ereignis) 42 These notes 
are often written in an almost cryptic shorthand, difficult to decipher, and 
revolving around the central formulations of the later Heidegger 
It is startlingly clear from a little­known text of three lectures from 1925 
that by Dasein, Heidegger had originally meant the specific “being” that 
the individual human being “is”, even if this being can only be defined as 
“a living being that always has before it a not­yet­being” 43 The understand­
ing of Dasein elucidated in Sein und Zeit is this specific “being”  It is this 
“being” that Heidegger specifically defines as “being towards death”, as only 
completed at death, and therefore to be mortal, oriented on death, is to 
fulfil one’s “being” (das Sein)  What is “metaphysical” in this understanding, 
however, is that there remains in this understanding the continued and ex­
plicit tendency for “presence” (die Anwesenheit) to be understood as what 
this being (ein Seiendes) brings to presence “for itself ” even as a “not yet”, as 
something not yet fully accomplished, because the completion of this pres­
ence lies in the future (at death)  At this point Heidegger’s understanding 
of Sein zum Tode depends, yet again, on a “not yet”, a deferral, an ἐπέκεινα 
τῆς οὐσίας or “beyond present being” (we see immediately the parallels 
between the earlier Heidegger and Derrida’s thought of the trace)  Quite the 
reverse, however, turns out to be the case: the “not yet” is itself dependent 
on immediate presence, on the presencing of present presence  But I am not 
the presencing of present presence, but rather, my mortality, and even more 
the present understanding of it, is only possible because of the compelling 
and always­emerging presence of present presence itself 
It is with this understanding that we can make sense of the only other 
reference to “being towards death” published in Heidegger’s lifetime, in the 
1949 publication of an Introduction, added to the text of Heidegger’s lecture 
on the nothing of 1929, What is Metaphysics  Here Heidegger talks of “the 
standing­out within the openness of being”, which is characterized by the 
twin poles of “the sustaining of standing­out (care), and enduring in the 
outermost (being towards death), together and as the full unfolding of ex­
istence”  The German of “standing­out” is “das Innestehen”, which has the 
resonance of innerste (“innermost”) of taking into care, but actually means 
a “standing­fast”, so that Heidegger characterizes existence as the stretch 
across an opposition, and so between what is most inward and what is 
42  Martin Heidegger, Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen (GA82), Frankfurt 2018, 133: “S  386: 
‘der verborgene Grund der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins’: ‘das eigentliche Sein zum Tode’, ‘die 
Endlichkeit der Zeitlichkeit ’ Was ist damit gemeint? Metaphysisch! Das Da­sein als Übergang 
in das Ereignis ist in sich geschichtlich, genauer – das Da­sein ” Italics in original 
43  Heidegger, Vorträge (GA80 1), 128, 138: “[Das Dasein] immer nur bestimmen als ein 
Lebendiges, das immer noch ein Noch­nicht­Sein vor sich hat ” Surely, this is what Heidegger 
means when he says several times in later texts that no one has ever yet been Dasein 
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outermost  A note added to this sentence records a remark in Heidegger’s 
own edition of the text: “Letting death come towards oneself, composing 
oneself for the arrival of death within the com­pass of beXing ”44
“Being towards death” means the preparedness for being able to die, 
and so preparedness to bear the finitude that death brings  Again, there is 
much that could be said here, if we had the time  Derrida himself had noted 
the connection Heidegger had wanted to indicate between the crossing­ 
through of beXing and das Geviert, the fourfold of heaven and earth, mor­
tals (die Sterblichen, θνητοί) and divinities (ἀθάνατοι), that Heidegger had 
first introduced to a public audience in the 1949 lecture “Das Ding” 45 In a 
note from around 1936, Heidegger identifies a series of connections between 
“being towards death”, the 1929 essay “On the Essence of Ground”, and 
Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), which together prepare the ground for 
“the originary and unvocalized relations that are to be grasped – between the 
unfolding (Wesen) of beyng (das Seyn) and its grounding within Da-sein” 46 
These connections effectively name a path of the development of his own 
thinking  They begin with “being towards death”, the original exploration 
of the different ways in which in Sein und Zeit Heidegger had developed 
an understanding of the differing modes of the presencing of presence for 
“oneself ”, and “for another”  The reference to “On the Essence of Ground” 
represents the culmination of Heidegger’s working­out of the meaning of 
the “nothing” and of the “not” in the explication of the finitude of Dasein, 
and what Heidegger calls the “abyss” of freedom  What of the final step, 
named here with Hölderlin? In ways that have hardly yet been paid suf­
ficient attention, it becomes clear that Heidegger found in Hölderlin the 
possibility for developing the original elucidation of the inter­relations of 
the fourfold  Heidegger does not ever say that Hölderlin is the source or 
origination of the thought of the fourfold, rather he shows what Heideg­
ger himself has found  He says, “presumably” in Hölderlin the paired pair 
of earth and heaven, mortals and deathless ones, is constantly in play 47 
44  Heidegger, Wegmarken (GA9), 374: “Das Innestehen in der Offenheit des Seins, 
das Austragen des Innestehens (Sorge) und das Ausdauern im Äußersten (Sein zum Tode)
a zusammen und als das volle Wesen der Existenz ” The note [a] adds: “Auf sich zu­kommen 
lassen den Tod, sich halten in der Ankunft des Todes als des Ge­Birgs des SeiXns ” We should 
note how close what is said here is to the definition of θνητός in Schneider, Handwörterbuch 
der Griechischen Sprache 
45  Jacques Derrida, De l’esprit: Heidegger et la question, Paris 1987, 82  See Martin 
Heidegger, Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge (GA79), Frankfurt 1994, 12 
46  Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen II–VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938) (GA94), Frankfurt 
2014, 290: “Die ursprünglichen und unausgesprochenen Bezüge zu begreifen – diejenigen 
zwischen dem Wesen des Seyns und seiner Gründung im Da-sein ” Italics in original 
47  Martin Heidegger, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (GA4), Frankfurt 1981, 163: 
“Wir achten jetzt nur auf die Worte ‘wirklich / Ganzem Verhältniß, samt der Mitt’ und 
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Heidegger vocalizes what lies unvocalized (unausgesprochen), unthematized, 
in Hölderlin, but still presences within what he has to say, and so is “there” 
(Da)  Heidegger names how he became aware of a persisting presence  Not 
one that has a “rationale”, one that could have been predicted in advance, 
but the very opposite: one that simply unfolds itself and waits to be vocal­
ized, and yet is determinative for world  This presence, however, reaches all 
the way back to the Greeks themselves  For Heidegger argues repeatedly 
that Hölderlin far surpasses even Hegel in elucidating the very origins of 
Western thought through his engagement with the Greeks  It is this that 
is “unvocalized”, but nevertheless present  The fourfold is this founding, 
ever­present, presence 
The fourfold, for which early sketches appear in Heidegger’s Beiträge zur 
Philosophie, and whose elements are discussed in the 1935 lecture course 
published as Einführung in die Metaphysik,48 can indeed be seen already pre­
sent in its elemental relations in the fragments we have of the poet Sappho 
(c  630–c  570 BCE), and also, for instance, in the Iliad 49 Heidegger’s later 
consideration of “being towards death”, hidden from public view and so bare­
ly present in his published works, continues apace throughout the Nachlaß 
notebooks, and its connection with being­mortal (θνητός) is at times made 
absolutely explicit, and with direct reference to the crossing through of 
beXing: “As world­fourfold humanity in­dwells, if it becomes properly 
joined to it as mortal  Human Dasein, experienced as being towards death, 
is the thoughtful intimation of the presence of being­mortal ”50 This is to 
some extent a loose translation  What is said here only makes sense if it is 
understood as also a comment on Sein und Zeit, and so on the passageway 
from the conceptualization of “being towards death” to a return to an origi­
nary understanding of θνητός, being­mortal 
Derrida was intrigued by Heidegger’s practice of the striking­through of 
beXing  He had available to him only a few scattered occasions in print 
where Heidegger had made the gesture  During his lifetime, and in pub­
lished work, Heidegger made reference only to being as das Sein, but in 
the extensive, indeed almost ubiquitous, uses in the Nachlaß material Hei­
degger strikes through only his archaic use, das Seyn  There has been some 
verstehen sie vermutungsweise als den Namen für jenes Ganze von Erde und Himmel, Gott 
und Mensch ”
48  Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (GA65), 310; Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die 
Metaphysik (GA40), Frankfurt 1983, 17 
49  Homer, Iliad III 276–279 
50  Martin Heidegger, Vier Hefte I und II (Schwarze Hefte 1947–1950) (GA99), Frankfurt 
2019, 116: “Welt­Geviert erwohnt der Mensch, wenn er zum Sterblichen eigens geeignet 
worden  Menschliches Dasein, als Sein zum Tode erfahren, ist der gedachte Wink in das 
Wesen des Sterblichen ”
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debate among Heidegger scholars about what difference Heidegger intend­
ed to indicate between das Sein and das Seyn, with some even claiming that 
Heidegger is confused  There is, in fact, no confusion: by das Sein Hei­
degger means that understanding of being that belongs to the difference 
between das Sein, being, and das Seiende, which is often translated (in order 
to distinguish it) as “beings”  It is this that he had originally characterized 
as the “ontological difference”  Das Seiende does not mean “beings” in their 
thingliness, it means the being of what is here­present: in short, Anwesen-
heit, pres ence as such, the presence of the present, which can manifest in a 
present being, but can also manifest as what the Greeks mean by τὰ ὄντα 
(which is a plural), or just (singular) τὸ πάν, “the singularly all that is pre­
sent”  Das Seyn, in contrast, is a shorthand, and really means “Wahrheit des 
Seyns”, the originarily unfolding truth of beyng, that lets presence “pres­
ence”  With the emergence of the fourfold, Heidegger allows the interpre­
tation of the ontological differ ence to fall back, in favour of what emerges 
through the fourfold, namely the “in­between” (Inzwischen), the “relation” 
(der Bezug) that is the clearing (die Lichtung) that opens out within the four­
fold  Pres ence presences, as the emerging of whatever emerges, in this “rela­
tion”  The most originary name of this emerging is φύσις, the presencing of 
the self­emerging, what unfolds for itself and brings itself out and into the 
light  The other name Heidegger finds among the Greeks for this is τὸ ζῆν  
As this place (relation), it is also the place where what emerges and presences 
also passes away, a place of presence as γένεσις and φθορά 
Derrida interprets the striking­through that came to prominence in “Zur 
Seinsfrage”51 (and that the Nachlaß notes of the period is shot through with) 
in contrast to a much earlier striking­through of Heidegger’s (that in fact 
just precedes the first of the Nachlaß notebooks), and that appears in a 
lecture course of around 1929  What interests Derrida is a certain “erasure of 
the name”, whereby the “the striking­through speaks not only of something 
other and taking something as other: but generally not accessible as present 
being” 52 Derrida wants to interpret the two strikings­through as radically 
opposed to each other  It would seem he is in a particularly strong position 
to do so, especially since the first relates to Heidegger’s claims about ani­
mals and poverty of world (even worldlessness), and the second concerns 
the fourfold  However, in 1929 Heidegger is actually drawing attention 
to the phenomenological access to what presences in presence, and this is 
51  Heidegger, Wegmarken (GA9), 385–426 
52  Derrida, De l’esprit, 83: “Rature du nom ” Derrida cites Martin Heidegger, Die 
Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit (GA29/30), Frankfurt 1983, 291–
292: “Die Durchstreichung besagt nicht nur: etwas anderes und als etwas anderes genommen, 
sondern: überhaupt nicht als Seiendes zugänglich ” Italics in original 
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also what is at issue in the striking­through of beXyng in the fourfold  In 
1929 what Heidegger is concerned with is our capacity to see that there are 
both poorer and richer ways of the appropriation of presence, in its self­ 
emergence  In each case, both the poorer and the richer sense relies on the 
full presence of the emergent, but on a presence that is to varying degrees 
marked by absence  We have already seen what it means, mortally to be 
faced with death and seek to escape its grasp, to run away from death even 
as it presences before us, as that presence that threatens to tear us away from 
life itself  What, however, of when, confronted with presence, we succeed 
in escaping, or, more to the point, when, confronted with presence, we do 
not recognize the how, the character of the presence itself? Even in 1929 it is 
not really what the animal sees that is at issue, but what we see, in watching 
the animal  Seeing the manner in which the animal is deprived of the full 
meaning of the presence that presences, what we actually notice is the pres­
ence of world, not of the thing that has emerged within that world, such 
that the animal can only take it in a limited way  Since we see a different 
way in which presence is less present (“poorer”), this time, however, without 
the fright and terror of mortal death  Such a recognition would be our own 
preliminary access to a phenomenon that also confronts us, namely the ca­
pacity of presence not only to present itself, but also to hide and withdraw 
from – not the animal so much – as us, ourselves 
In a late note, Heidegger argues the fundamental connection between 
death itself, and “being towards death”, hints at the seemingly difficult to 
grasp connections between Sein und Zeit and das Seyn and the striking­ 
through of beXyng  Heidegger asks: “Can humanity think the outer­
most? Does it stand already, as human­essence, in such recollection? How 
does it stand with a correctly experienced thinking of death? Is not this 
uttermost recollection ‘being towards death’ itself?” After repeating the 
phrase “death is the compass of beXyng”, he concludes (in parentheses) 
“why did Sein und Zeit deal with ‘being towards death’? In order, perhaps, to 
give some thoughtless time to nihilism? Or rather, or only, so that Sein und 
Zeit could think about beXyng?”53 Heidegger names here the fundamental 
conun drum of the text Sein und Zeit itself, both for him and all its subse­
quent readership  Is it to be read as “earlier” Heidegger and metaphysics? Or 
could it only say what it said because it was already so much on the way to 
53  Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen VI–IX (Schwarze Hefte 1948/49–1951) (GA98), 
Frankfurt 2018, 140: “Kann der Mensch das Äußerste denken? Steht er schon, als 
Menschenwesen, in solchem Andenken? Wie steht es mit dem recht erfahrenen Denken an 
den Tod? Ist nicht dieses äußerste Andenken das ‘Sein zum Tode’? Tod aber ist das Gebirg 
des SeyXns  [   ] (Warum handelt ‘Sein und Zeit’ vom ‘Sein zum Tode’? Vielleicht um einer 
gedankenlosen Zeit zum Nihilismus zu verhelfen? Oder gar, oder nur; um in ‘Sein und Zeit’ 
an das SeXyn zu denken?) ” Italics in original 
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naming, not being (das Sein), but beyng (das Seyn) and the fourfold relation 
of presence’s present? How you answer this question will determine who 
you are as a thinker, even if you yourself are Heidegger 
Is death, finding ourselves ones living from out of death’s advance towards 
us, living as mortals (ordered towards death), precisely what allows us to 
understand the truth of being at all? Was it “being towards death” itself, 
the re­emergence of humanity as θνητός, that enabled Sein und Zeit to 
reach beyond the language of metaphysics (in which, to some extent, it still 
spoke)?
In one of the texts I cited earlier Heidegger describes the striking­through 
of beXyng not only in the way we have already encountered, but as an 
opposition between “scrimping” and an “originary freeing” 54 The “scrimp­
ing” and withholding that characterizes an impoverishment is also a hu­
man experience of worldlessness, of the loss of the meaning of being­mortal 
and the flight of the gods, of the expenditure of the earth and the dullness 
and dreariness of a sky long emptied of the dazzling sun  In such a world­ 
impoverished world presence is marked by a not­ness, by a deathliness that 
is not death itself, but a life in death  In such a world the originary truth 
of being withdraws and is covered over, struck­out  In such a world things 
emerge or are wrested into presence in an only ghostly way, shadows of 
themselves  Only such a possibility of being can explain how presence pres­
ences across a twofold, from both the splendour of its emerging, to what 
can only emerge by remaining hidden and covered over  Are ghosts the 
harbingers of our poverty in the presence of the present?
Indeed, this is how Heidegger describes the unfolding of the fourfold  
In his spoken preface to a public delivery of his lecture “Elucidations of 
Hölderlin’s Poetry”, Heidegger offers to bring those who listen (and I trans­
late here very freely) “out of the conscripted technological word (das Ge-stell) 
which is the self­withdrawing eventuality of the fourfold” 55 The fourfold 
must also be the originary ground, not only of the paired pairs of mortals 
and immortals, earth and heavens, but also world’s withdrawal, as the will 
to will and the “essence of technology”  These too, must be explained and 
stand on an originary fourfold ground which is present in poverty, present 
in withdrawal 
Presence hides itself from us as ones surrounded by ghosts, or allows us 
to stand out within a world, but only as fully mortal  How we encounter 
mortality is never a direct path, for the path itself is beset with flight and 
54  Heidegger, Vier Hefte I und II (GA99), 116: “Das Zwischen von Erde und Himmel 
durchkreuzt die Nachbarschaft von Sparnis und Freye ”
55  Heidegger, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (GA4), 153: “Aus dem Ge­Stell als dem 
sich selbst verstellenden Ereignis des Gevierts ”
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distraction, until we have no choice but to be caught, and caught up, in 
dread mortality (which is always most of all my own, jemeinig)  Only when 
dread mortality is uncovered for me and I cannot elude it, do I encounter 
our mortality, do we prepare for death and let death advance upon us in and 
as the splendour of life itself 
To write a theology requires an adequate account of being  Being, 
however, belongs only to the unfolding essence of present presence, its only 
place; it does not occur “elsewhere”, “beyond” or even as the place of the 
eternal or absolute, as the essential ground of gods, or God  Being, present 
being, is that place alone wherein gods and God appear  Being would not 
appear in the description of gods, or God’s essence, since essencing, being, 
is the wherein of their coming­forth and appearing (and withdrawal and 
flight)  p
summary
This paper examines the ontological question that persists in Derrida's 
conception of a "hauntology", proposing that it is the last echo of the very 
"metaphysics of presence" that Derrida himself proposes to leave behind. 
The paper suggests that in the phrase "metaphysics of presence", Derrida 
had presumed that what was to be overcome was "presence", whereas for 
Heidegger all thinking is in fact an overcoming of "metaphysics" that al­
lows presence (Anwesenheit) to be understood in both its most origi nary 
(as the "truth of beyng" or Wahrheit des Seyns) and its most futural (as 
the Da of Da-sein) senses. The paper re­examines two phrases central to 
Derrida's reading of Heidegger: one is the meaning of Sein zum Tode (be­
ing towards death), the other is Heidegger's "striking through" of beXyng, 
and proposes that, through our being unable to evade the most extreme 
moment of having to face death as the ineluctability of being­no­longer 
present, we are able finally to unveil the meaning presence for itself.
